ismycodesafe.com

What a real scan returns

This is an actual scan of datafolka.no, run on 2026-10-30. Header values, DNS records and certificate details are copied straight from the response. Nothing here is a mockup, and nothing was arranged in advance. What you see covers the header, TLS, DNS and cookie checks; the full category list is further down, so you can tell what this run measured from what the scanner also covers.

Target
datafolka.no
Scanned
2026-10-30
Shown here
4 of 28 families
Confirmed issues
1

Why this domain and not ismycodesafe.com: a scanner grading itself proves nothing. datafolka.no belongs to the same person, runs a different stack, and is reachable so you can check the findings yourself. It is a reasonably hardened site, so this sample shows what a scan looks like when most things are already right, which is the harder case to read.

Confirmed issues

Things the scan proved from the response, not inferred.

Confirmed

DMARC enforcement

A05 Security Misconfiguration

DMARC is published but set to p=none, so nothing is rejected

Evidence
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:postmaster@datafolka.no, mailto:dmarc@datafolka.no; pct=100; adkim=s; aspf=s

p=none is monitoring only. Alignment is strict (adkim=s, aspf=s) and reports are being collected, so the groundwork is done, but a forged sender is still delivered. Move to p=quarantine once the reports show no legitimate sender failing.

Hardening gaps

Real, verified absences with lower impact. Kept separate so the list above stays honest.

Hardening

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy

A05 Security Misconfiguration

Header absent (6 of 7 present)

Evidence
missing: ["Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy"]

Without COOP a window opened from another origin can keep a reference to yours. Low impact on a site with no authenticated session, which is why it is listed here and not above.

Hardening

CAA record

No CAA record published

Evidence
caa: { present: false }

Any certificate authority may issue for the domain. A CAA record limits that to the ones you use. Let's Encrypt is the current issuer, so the record would be short.

Hardening

MTA-STS

No MTA-STS policy

Evidence
mta_sts: { present: false }

Mail senders fall back to opportunistic TLS, which can be stripped. Relevant because MX is live (smtp.google.com).

Hardening

TLS-RPT

No TLS reporting policy

Evidence
tls_rpt: { present: false }

Without TLS-RPT there is no signal when mail delivery to the domain fails TLS. Pairs with MTA-STS.

What passed

Included because coverage is the thing a sample has to prove. A scan that only lists problems tells you nothing about what it looked at.

Passed

TLS certificate and protocol

Valid, TLSv1.3, expires 9 Jan 2027

Evidence
issuer: Let's Encrypt (YR2), subject: datafolka.no, protocol: TLSv1.3

Current protocol, 71 days of validity left at scan time. The scanner flags certificates inside 30 days.

Passed

Strict-Transport-Security

Present, two-year max-age

Evidence
max-age=63072000

Long enough to qualify for HSTS preload, though includeSubDomains and preload are not set.

Passed

Content-Security-Policy

Present, frame-ancestors 'none'

Evidence
default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://analytics.ahrefs.com https://eu-assets.i.posthog.com; ... frame-ancestors 'none'

Real policy rather than a placeholder. script-src still allows 'unsafe-inline', which the full report calls out as the next thing to remove.

Passed

X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy

All four present

Evidence
DENY / nosniff / strict-origin-when-cross-origin / geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=()

Clickjacking, MIME sniffing, referrer leakage and device access all covered.

Passed

SPF and DKIM

Both present and aligned

Evidence
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all · dkim selectors: [google]

Sender authentication is in place. Only the DMARC policy above is holding back enforcement.

Passed

Cookie attributes

No cookies set on first response

Evidence
cookies_checked: 0, findings: []

Nothing to misconfigure. Reported as zero rather than as a pass, so the number is not mistaken for a verified result.

Every category in the full scan

The findings above come from the headers, TLS, DNS and cookie checks. A full scan runs all of these, with CVE lookups against NVD and OSV for every detected technology:

SSL/TLS certificateDeep TLS (SSLyze)Security headersCookie attributesOpen portsExposed OWASP pathsDNS recordsCORS policyHTTP methodsRedirect chainSensitive contentAnonymous FTPOpen SMTP relaySubdomainsBlocklist reputationTechnology stackJavaScript librariesJS CVE scanWAF detectionLogin page analysisRate limitingError page leakageCVE lookup (NVD/OSV)Threat intelligenceShodan InternetDBCertificate transparencyurlscan.ioSEO and AI readiness

What the paid report adds

The free scan shows what is wrong. The one-off report turns each finding into a fix you can hand to a developer, with a CVSS score and its OWASP Top 10 category, ordered by what to do first. The AI-written parts are disclosed as such, because a fix plan you cannot audit is worth less than one you can.

Scans are external and read-only. Nothing is exploited and no payload is sent. Only scan sites you own or have permission to scan. Run by Roy Morken.